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ing death, in the sense of retribution, and is one with the God-idea. Its negation by Mosaism, Buddhism, and Confucianism is discussed. For the general conclusions we are referred to the forthcoming volume. Great stress is laid on the worth of childhood for normal religious psychology and upon the principal *quod volumus credimus*, as even the gods are creatures of our wishes. The feeling that no trace of our earthly life can vanish in all the æons is neither pious nor true. It is not more the *horror nihili* than the impossibility of conceiving annihilation that constitutes the strong negative motive. Psychological considerations warrant no inference concerning the truth or error of an idea so profoundly and irresistibly motivated. This and more underlies all myth, dogma and revelation touching post-mortem existence.

*Einleitung in die Philosophie.* Von OSWALD KÜLPE, Professor an der Universität, Würzburg. Leipzig, 1895, pp. 276.

Called from Wundt's laboratory to the chair of philosophy, it is natural that Dr. Külpe should interest himself with the introduction to philosophy, and he states that this little volume arose from didactic needs and experiences. The author proposes a "complete orientation concerning the bearing and essence of philosophy," and would describe the "various independent tendencies and achievements in the past and present" with unprejudiced and equal interest, with an evaluation of their value, despite the unavoidable subjectivity and limitations of knowledge. As general disciplines he treats metaphysics, theory of knowledge and logic, and as special disciplines he takes up the philosophy of nature, psychology, ethics and the philosophy of right, æsthetics and philosophy of religion and of history. The tendencies he discusses are singularism and pluralism, materialism, spiritualism, dualism, monism, mechanism, teleology, determinism, and the theological and psychological tendencies in metaphysics. The epistemological directions are rationalism, empiricism, criticism, dogmatism, skepticism, positivism, idealism, realism and phenomenism. The ethical sections are headed: views on the origin of morals, the morals of feeling and reflection, individualism and universalism, subjectivism and objectivism. The final sections are on the problem and system of philosophy.

Those who have heard Wundt's lectures upon the above philosophical tendencies or read his works will find little that is novel in this book. The revival of the old German idea of a propædeutic or encyclopedia of philosophy was a happy thought, and raises very interesting problems touching the progress of philosophy. Its first suggestion, even in the index, is that in America our professors are in danger of losing the sense of proportion among these disciplines in their teaching. If this is the best introduction, then the methods of inducting the novice through Locke, Berkeley and Hume, or ethics, or elemental logic, ethics or psychology, are wrong. If the object of such an introduction is to develop a bird's-eye knowledge of vast intellectual fields, Dr. Külpe is right, but from his standpoint philosophy is in so far an information study, and its culture power is not much evoked. On the whole one inclines to the view that such preliminary triangulation of vast mental spaces would prove dreary to American students, and that it is too abstract if not too superficial. Possibly a riper scholar in the field, with larger experience in teaching, might bring out greater culture power than Dr. Külpe has done with all his hardihood in attempting an "ology" of all the philosophical isms.

G. S. H.

*Friedrich Eduard Beneke, the man and his philosophy. An introductory study.* By FRANCIS BURKE BRANDT, PH. D. New York, 1895, pp. 167.

This is an interesting, convenient and careful work, and is No. 4 of the "Columbia College Contributions" to philosophy, psychology and education. The first thirty-seven pages are devoted to Beneke's life and character and the rest to his doctrines, with a final critical estimate, influence and followers. The whole is clearly told, and we are indebted to it for a better view of the system than we have ever had before in English.

#### VI.—MISCELLANEOUS.

*The Psychology of Number and its Applications to Methods of Teaching Arithmetic.* By JAMES A. MCLELLEN, Principal of the Ontario School of Pedagogy, Toronto, and JOHN DEWEY, PH. D., Head Professor of Philosophy in the University of Chicago. International Education Series. New York, 1895, pp. 309.

We can think of few subjects in the entire field of psychology that are riper for comprehensive treatment, or the applications of which are more needed in pedagogy, than the psychology of number. Many studies have been made in laboratories on the perception of dots, lines, figures, in the direct and indirect field; many more on counting and the various rhythms involved, the "psychic constant" and its compounds, the psychology of born calculators has been worked out, and the number-systems of primitive people and children's idea of numbers. Other studies are made on number forms, on fatigue in simple operation on numbers, etc. Thus, when we first saw the announcement of this book by an author so capable of gathering up and coördinating these and other lines of work, with the historic material, hardly less interesting, we looked forward with great interest to this book. Dire, however, has been our disappointment. Not one of all these topics is treated with any serious effort at thoroughness, if, indeed, any of them are mentioned. Again, there are many methods of teaching elementary arithmetic, both current and historical, and these should also have been at least mastered by the pedagogic author with a thoroughness of which these pages give no trace. We would suggest for a title of this work, "A Method of Teaching Arithmetic, Explained and Justified, and Preceded by some Philosophic Considerations." We must sympathize with a teacher who, in commenting on it, said in substance that "if the new psychology had nothing better to offer than this, its barrenness will be a great disappointment to hosts of teachers." The first chapter is entitled, "What psychology can do for the teachers," and is surely needed. Number, it is urged, is, first of all, a rational process and not a sense fact. This cuts up all experimental roots at the start, is at best only a partial truth in the author's sense, and is radically and profoundly not only unpedagogic, but anti-pedagogic. The first *educational summary* is: "The idea of number is not impressed upon the mind by objects, even when these are presented under the most favorable circumstances." Thus nearly every object lesson in arithmetic since Comenius is wrong. The origin of number is derived from the Hegelian ideas of limit. The psychology of quantity is "summed up" in these italicized words: "That which fixes the magnitude or quantity which, in any given case, needs to be measured, is some activity or movement internally continuous, but externally limited. That which increases this whole is some union or partial activity into which the original continuous activity may be broken up (analysis) and which, repeated